Abstract: This article is a response to c riticisms of · my book on Karl Marx 1 s Theory of History which were made by four authors in last December1s number of Anal~se & Kritik. After clarifying (section 2) an ambiguity in an argument for hlstorical materialism which is presented in the book , I contend (J-s), against objections raised by Philippe Van Parijs , that historical materialism is consistent only if it explains production relations functionally, by reference to their propensity to develop the productive forces. Next (6-8) I address and rebut the views of Wal Suchtin g and Milton Fisk , who both think that the role of dass stru· ggle in historical materialism is larger t han the one I assign to it. Finally (9-12) I try to vindicate the doctrine of base and superstructure proposed in my book against the skepticism of Steven Lukes.
1.
l n this article I answer objections to my Karl Marx's T heory of History ( refer red to henceforth as KMTH) offered by four critics in last December's number of Anal yse & Kritik.
1 ' Since publishing KMTH I have, in a number of subsequent articles, criticized it quite extensively myseiL While I still think that the central explanations of historical materialism are , or are akin to , functional explanations, I have revised my view of what functional explanation is (see Cohen 1982) . And while I continue to maintain that, on a Marxist view, social revolution occurs when and because r elations of production fetter productive forces, I have belatedly addressed myself to problems, which were blithely ignored in KMTH, about what, precisely, fettering is (see Cohen 1983a) . I have, in addition, raised doubts (no more than that) about the compatibility between historical materialism and certain elementary features of human nature (Cohen r983b) , and I have also questioned whether the scope of historical materialism need be as wide as KMTH unreflectively assumed it was (Cohen I98JC) .
But none of that rev•s•on and retraction bears on the matters in dispute between me and my Analyse & Kritik critics. I still think, against V an Parijs, that something like functional explanation is an essential device for rendering historical materialism coherent; against Suchting and Fisk, that ( r) is called the Development Thesis, and (2) the Primacy Thesis: it asserts the explanatory primacy of the productive forces over the relations of production. I show that Marx held both theses, and I then proceed to argue for them, in their own right. In the latter exercise I begin by adducing considerations in support of (I) , and then, taking (I) as established, I derive (z) using (I) as a premiss. So my argument for the primacy of · the productive forces incorporates an initial argument for thesis (I) , the claim that the productive forces inherently tend to develop. Now the apparent inconsistency which I wish to expose is between my argument for the primacy of the productive forces (in section (4) of Chapter VI) and my exposition of the nature of that primacy (in sections (s) through (7)). Section (4) is supposed to argue for a view sections (s) through (7) expound, but there is an apparent mismatch between the argument and what it is an argument for, which has given rise to an understandable and widespread misinterpretation of my position. That the misinterpretation is natural is shown by the fact that some of my most sophisticated critics have adopted it.
To expose the apparent inconsistency, Iet us ask: why do the forces of production tend to develop? Why, that is, do existing forces tend to be replaced by better ones? According to KMTH, the tendency obtains because superior forces make possible a lightening of the burden of human labour. There is a propensity to progress in productive power because such progress attenuates the material scarcity whose consequence is that people "cannot satisfy their wants unless they spend the better part of their time and energy doing what they would rather not do, engaged in labour which is not experienced as an end in itself" (Cohen 1978, 152) . This is the reason underlying the tendency to advance in productive power, and, consequently, the actual advance in which that t endency is realized. Now while the tendency to productive improvemeht is realized if and only if there are ·recurrent particular instances of improvement, it does not follow that the explanation of each instance must be the same as, or even similar to, the explanation of the general tendency to improvement. The underlying reason for the tendency can explain why the re ~ so many instances of improvement without explaining each particular instance of it. T his point being crucial, it requires a measure of elaboration.
Whatever may be the underlying reason for productive progress, th e immediate mechanism of that progress is the replacement of less good forces by better ones, by human beings who favour t hat replacement. Now the c r ucial point is that, while the unde rlying reason for productive progress in general is labou r reduction, it does not follow that the reason for a given instance of that progress, the reason operative in the mind of the person(s) who caused better forces to be adopted, is to reduce the labour of some person or group. If .a self-employing peasant adopts a superior plough, his reason for thereby improving the forces is indeed similar in content to what I say is the underlying reason for their improvement in general: he does so in order to reduce the amount of labour he must put in per unit output. But if a capitalist adopts pr.oductively superior instruments or methods, then he does so to protect or increase his profit, and not at all in order to lighten anyone's labour. Yet the underlying reason for productive progress even here, in my view, retai'ns its role, since, a ccording to that view, capitalism prevails when it does because of the massive contribution it makes to the conquest of scarcity, however remote that end may be from the motivation of forces-improving capitalist. l n sum, the reason for a particular improvement of the forces need not resemble the underlying reason why, in general, they improve, but I am widely mis inter preted as thinking that there always is that resemblance. Attention to my exposition of the nature of the primacy of the forces in sections (s) through (7) of Chapter VI would dispel such a misinterpretation, but it is fed by a natural misreading of the argument for primacy presented in section (4), to which I now turn.
That argument contains qualifications and a uxiliary developments which there is no room here to rehearse. I can here state only the heart of the argument, which is that the productive forces tend to develop because people "are disposed to reflect on what they are doing and to discern superior ways of doing it. Knowledge expands, and sometimes its extensions are open to productive use, and are seen to b.e so. Given their rationality, and their inclement situation, when k nowledge provides the opportunity of expanding productive power they will tend to take it, for not to do so would be irrational." (Cohen 1978, 153) l n this argument, human beings are rational and innovative creatures who have a scarcity problem, which they contrive to solve by improving their forces of production. lt is natural, but wrong, to interpret the argument as requiring that the agents who actually introduce better forces always do so in order that their own burden of labou r will be lightened. The picture I regre ttably encouraged is of individual producers, or cooperating groups of them, striving to upgrade their skills and means of production, so that labour will lie less heavily upon them, a picture in which global p·roductive progress is explained merely as the aggregate result of those several strivings . Following Andrew Levine and Erik Wr ight (I98o) 2 , we can call this the Rational Adaptive practices (or RAP ) view of the development of the forces. lt is not the view I held, but it emerges naturally from the quoted passage. I did not hold it because it excludes the important possibility that the underlying reason fo r advance in productive power may contrast with the reason for particular instances of it, as is plainly illustrated by the development of the forces under capitalism. The way the forces develop under capitalism contradicts the picture of their development conveyed by the paragraph quoted above when it is read in the most natural wa y.
How, then, did I intend my argument? In my own construal of it, it was, as I said (Cohen 1978, 159) , "an attempt to render explicit the premisses" of utterances of Marx quoted at pp. 159-6o of KMTH. Here is one of them, from his Ietter to Annenkov of ·1846: .
" ... in order that they may not be deprived of the result attained, and forfeit the fruits of civilization , (people) are obliged from the moment when their mode of intercourse no Ionger corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to change all their traditional social forms. "
Texts like the Annenkov Ietter confer a Marxian pedigree on my use of human rationality as a basis for asserting the primacy of the productive forces, but here that rationality is not applied at the point where it is applied on the RAP view, which such texts do not support. T he claim here is not that the producers themselves introduce superior forces to lighten their own labour: that this happens is not denied, but it is not p ut forward as the ·general c ase. lnstead, what is said is that, being rational, people retain or reject relations of production according as the latter do or do not allow productive improvement to continue. l n Van Parijs's apt formulation (p. 202)3, I do not here posit a "search-and-selection process which operates directly on the ... productive forces", but "one which operates on the r elations of production, which in turn contro! the searchand-selection of productive forces". This is a non-RAP reading of the argument for the development thesis. lt is the reading I intended, and, unlike the RAP reading, it is consistent with the exposition of the nature of the p rimacy of the forces in section s ( 5)-( 7) of Chapter V I.
In that exposition relations of production can be what I shall call the ~ of the development of the for ces. Relations are a source of development when it is their emplacement in relations of p roduction, and not any interest in reducing labour, which induces agents to improve the forces.4 That relations are sometimes in this sense the source of the forces' development is compatible with the thesis of the primacy of the forces over the relations, as I elaborate it: the primacy· thesis implies that when relations are the source of the development of the forces they obtain precisely because they ensure ·that development. As I wrote:
"The bourgeoisie is a set of men defined as such by their emplacement in the economic structure. lt is that emplacement which makes them revolutionize the productive forces: a policy of innovation is impo.sed by competition. Capitalist production relations are, consequently, a prodigious stimulus to the development of the productive forces. But this is more than compatible with the thesis of the primacy of the productive forces as we have articulated it. lt is congenial to the thesis, for we assert that the fun ction of capitalist relations is to promote growth in productive power -they arise and persist when (and because) they are apt to do so." (Cohen 1978, 169-70 . I have added the phrase "and because" to improve the expression of what I had in mind.)
This is an application to capitalism of the generat thesis defended in sections (s) - (7), that given relations of production have the character they do because of the contribution they make, in virtue of that character , to the development of the productive forces. The problematic relations for that functional explanatory claim are not such as capita!ist ones which, being a source of, evidently contribute to, productive development. The problematic relations for the thesis that relations are functionally explainec are the pre-capitalist relations which Marx called "conservative": not being a source of development, they appear not to contrib ute to it. I devoted section (7) of Chapter VI to the problern conservative relations pose, and I tried to solve it by arguing that conservative relations could be, at the time when they obtain, optimal for productive development, and in place for that reason, even if they are only forms within which development occu r s, rather than, like capitalist ones, its ver y sou rce. Now, whether or not conservative relations pose a problern for the RAP view of the development of the forces, capitalist ones pose an insoluble problern for it. Accordingly, I held a non-RAP view when I propounded the argument which has been so widely RAP-interpreted. I have now made the non-RAP reading of it more explicit. lf, however, that reading of it · should turn out to be unsustainable, then I would give up the argument, rather than the non-RAP view of the development of the forces, which capitalism makes· mandatory.
3· Van Parijs's discussion of the De velopment Thesis (pp. 201-2) sharpened my perception of the difference between the RAP and non-RAP views , but it contains a number of errors which c all for comment.
To begin with, Van Parijs supposes that the RAP view is inconsistent with functional e xplanation of the relations by the forces. But, as I have just urged, relations can be hospitable to the development of the forces, a nd can therefore promote that development, even when they are not its very source. Not only its motor but also a good channel promotes the movement of a ship. He nce, even on a RAP view, relations might be functionally explained, by their propensity to allow the development of the forces to proceed.s
Nor should Van Parijs have said that, on the RAP view, relation s c an "brake or accelerate, but not alter the basic trend" of development of the forces. The implied contrast with the non-RAP view is. indefensible. lf the "basic trend" is the trend of the forces to develop to higher Ievels of power, then relations cannot indeed alter it on the RAP view, but nor can they on the non-RAP view: on both views relations which threaten to alter that basic trend count as fetters and succumb to revolution. And if by "basic trend" Van Parijs means something less basic than that , then there is no reason to think that relations cannot alter it on the RAP view. Relations can make a difference to aspects of how development proceeds not only if they are its sou rce but also if they are merel y the forms, and not the motivating source, of development.
These errors are connected with a further mistake. I have in mind Van Parijs's alignment of the distinction between RAP and non-RAP conceptions of the development of the forces '!Yith respecti vely these two statements, which he regards as divergent readings of the Development Thesis:
ET1 There is an autonomous tendency for the forces to develop.
ET2
There is a tendency for those relations to be selected which are best for (or facilitate) the development of the for ces.
Van Parijs aligns ET1 with the RAP view because he wrongly think s t hat ET1 is inconsistend with my "emphatic claim that production relations profoundly affect productive forces' " (2od (ET2 is consistent with the "Profound Effect" claim, since ET2 entails it). Now since, even on a RAP view, relations might block or allow development of the forces, it is not obvious that the RAP view is inconsistent with their exercise of a Profound Effect. But, however that may be, Van Parijs is wrong to think that ET 1 entails the RAP view and also wrong to think that ET 1 is inconsistent with the Profound Effect claim.
Van Parijs thinks these false things because he wrongly supposes that ETI entails what I shall call ETo: ETo There is a tendency for t he forces to develop autonomously.
ETo says that the forces tend to develop without assistance, and, therefore , without the assistance of the relations. ETo is indeed inconsistent with the Profound Effect claim, and it does rule out a non-RAP view.
But ET 1 does not entail ETo. ET1 assigns autonomy to the tendenc y of the forces to develop 6 , not to ' the development it is a tendency to. A child has an autonomous tendency to grow up: he is born with a disposition to do so, which is not externally instilled in him by, for example, his parents. But it does not follow that he has a tendency to grow up autonomously , independently of parental or other assistance. T he autonomy of the for ces' tendency to develop is relevantly parallel: ET1 denies t hat the explanation of their tendency to develop lies within the r elations, but it does not deny that they develop with relational assistance, or even that the relations c an be the immediate source of their development. Unlike ETo, ET1 is consistend with ET2, and therefore both with Profound Effect claim and with a non-RAP view of the development of the forces. The consistency of ET1 and ET2 is shown by the consistency of ET3, which entails both of them, and which says, as I do, that ETI explains ET2.
ET3
There is a tendency for those relations to be selected which are best for (or facilitate) the development of the forces, since there is an autonomous tendency for the forces to develop.
I would add, finally, that Van Parijs is also unjustified in presenting ET1 and ET2 as competing readings of the Development Thesis. I never said that anything like ET2 was the Development Thesis. ET1 is the development thesis, and, as ET3 implie. s, ET2 is derived from the Development Thesis (together with other considerations): the derivation is given on p . . 158 of KMT H. .
4· I now address Van Parijs's discussion of the primacy puzzle. I have always conceived that puzzle as follows, and never differently: Marx repeatedly asserts that relations of production correspond to Ievels of development of productive forces and, as I argue at pp. 136-8 of KMTH, such dictions assign explanatory primacy over the relations to the forces . Yet Marx knew that relations always control the development of the forces, anci are in some cases the very source of that development. The primacy puzzle is to reconcile the explanatory priority of the forces with the controlling roJe of the relation s.
I claimed that the only way to solve the primacy puzzle was to represent the relations as functionally explained by the forces. One must say that the relations are as they are because, being so, they are suitable to the further development of the forces, that suitability being due to the Ievel of development the forces have already reached Csee Cohen 1978, x6o) . The explanation is a functional one inasmuch as ·the relations are explained by their effect on the forces, which is to develop them. But that is not the whole of the explanation of the relations, and, if it were, the primacy of the forces would rerr.ain un-secured. To ensure their primacy it is neces-. sary to · add that, as I said, it is in virtue of the existing Ievel of · development of the forces that the relations have the developing effect · they do. I now restate the foregoing more schematically. Since (3) The Ievel of development of productive power determines which relations would promote the further development of productive power, and (4) The existing relations prevail because of their propensity to promote productive power, it follows that (2) The nature of the production relations of a society is explained by the Ievel of development of its productive forces, and (2) assigns explanatory primacy to the productive forces: (2) .!.! the primacy thesis. The primacy puzzle is to reconcile (2) with the truth of ( s), which is an entailment of (4):
(s) The existing relations promote the development of productive power.
And the puzzle is solved by asserting (3) and (4), which together entail both (2) and (s). But it is, more particularly, (4) which nullifies (s)'s threat to (2), and I therefore laid .Special emphasis on (4) when speaking of what solves the primacy puzzle. (4) does not establish-, w) thout (3), that (2) is true, but (4) does show that (s) does not refute (2).
The above · exposition is faithful to the text of KMTH, but .it is certainly more clear than it would have been had I lacked the benefit of Van Parijs's critique of my formulations. I agree with him that (4') does ·not by itself establish the primacy of the forces, and I see that formulations at pp. 161-2 of KMTH, read without reference back to pp. rs8-6o, which sets the context for them, might Iead a reader to thin k that I say that (4) itself ensures the primacy of the forces. Van Parijs is right that it does not, since it is consistent with, e.g., (6) The dominant ideology, which is independent of the existing Ievel of productive power, determines what relations would promote productive power.
(4) is not enough for primacy, since (4) and (6) entail that (2), the · primacy thesis; is false. Both (3) and (4) must be true for the primacy thesis, which is (2), to be true~ Notwithstanding that, neither (3) nor (4), nor even their conjunction ·, .!.! the primacy thesis, and I never said otherwise. I could not have been more explicit that precisely (2) is the p~imacy thesis·: it is introduced as such on the first page of Chapter IV, and again called that when it is defended at p. 158; and, contrary to what Van Parijs · says on p. 199 of his piece, I never "use the Iabel" "Primacy Thesis" to designate (4) .7
Wh y, then, does h·e find more than one primacy thesis in KMTH?
. . Because he inappropriatCiy contrasts an assertion of the primacy of the forces over the relations, which is what his PTo 8 , a summary of my (2) is, with a partial explication of the nature of that primacy, which is what his PT2 (my (4)) is: the statements play different· roles, and the second's roJe is not to assert the primacy of the forces. i?T2 (or (4)) is put forth a part of the solution to the primacy puzzle, which, to repeat, is to reconcile PTo (or (2) ). with ( 5), the fact that rela. tions promote the forces' development. PT2 (or (4)) does not· reassert the primacy thesis, or endow it with a different meaning. It specifies; in part, the nature of the primacy of the forces, with a view to showing how PTo (or (2)) can be true. The primacy thesis does not specify the nature of the primacy it asserts. It simply says that the current Ievel of development of the forces of production does enjoy explanatory primacy. Now if there is not more than one primacy thesis, there is not more than one primacy puzzle, and Van Parijs's several attempts to identify possible primacy puzzles ·(pp. 202-4) are alr wide of the mark. His first suggestion depends on mistreating (4) as a version of the primacy thesis. His third suggestion is, as he says, "far-fetched", and also, in my view, multiply bizarre. But his second Suggestion, in the second paragraph. on p. 203, calls for further comment.
This particular misidentification of the primacy puzzle results from Van Parijs's undue emphasis on my phrase "to a far greater extent", whose significance, as I indicated in footnote 8, he overvalues. Misled by that ph rase, he entertains the possibility that the primacy puzzle is how to establish that one side in a two-sided interaction is more influential th.an the other. But the "underlying problem" is not to reconcile primacy with . two-way causation, but with the particular "massive control" (V an Parijs, p. 202, quoting me) exercised by the relations. And the functional-explanatory device, which I unambiguously say solves the puzzle, could not be thought to justify the phrase "to a far greater extent"' since there is no relevant matter of degree which recourse to functional explanation settles here. lf relations control the deve1opment of forces, but are as they are because, in virtue of the forces' current Ievel; they have a pro-pensi.ty to develop them, we can conclude that the controlli ng roJe of the ·relations does not upset the primacy of the forces, but it would not be appropriate to conclude that the forces affect the relations more than the relation s affect the forces. 5· Does the model of fast and slow dynamics which Van Parijs presents in the final sections of his paper provide an alternative solution to. the primacy puzzle? Insofar as I understand the modeJ9 it perhaps provides a · solution to the puzzle in V an Parijs's second misconstrual of it, but it only solves the puzzle I described if, contrary to what Van Parijs says, it models the functional explanation which I say is needed to solve the puzzle. I now elaborate these claims.
What I find hard to understand is the concept of speed which Van Parijs exercises when he refers, for example, to "the ( higher) speed at which the relations adjust to the current Ievel of the forces and the (lower) speed at wh ich they ~ar ry the forces from on Ievel to another" (.ios). I understand the idea of a speed at which the relations develop the forces, and, once they are. assigned a dimension of variation 10 , I also u oderstand the idea of a speed at which relations adjust to forces. But I do· not know how to compare these speeds, and so I .cannot construe Van Parijs's claim that one .speed is higher than another -that claim seems blocked by an insurmountable incommensurability. And even if we surrealistically suppose that the speeds have somehow been made commensurable, by measuring them on cardinal scales with contrived zero-points , then I still do not see why the comparative speeds Van Parijs invokes establish ~ kind of primacy of the forces over the relations. And why, in any case, are relations said to adjust quickly to forces, when the failure of the former to correspond to the latter can be followed by an epoch of transition to new relations?
ßut Iet me now set aside these queries and respond to Van Parijs's proposals insofar as I do understand them. He says that the primacy of the forces may plausibly be identified with the claim. that, when forces and relations are in contradiction, "the relations adjust to the forces and not the other way around": the statement .about comparative speeds is supposed, somehow, to explicate that claim (see pp. 204, . But I do not ~ee how. such primacy can be understood non-functionally. Contradiction is, by definition, the circumstance that relation s fetter the development of the forces. Now if relations go when they fetter the forces, and that generalization is not an accident, then they go because they fetter the forces, because there is contradiction. But that is to say that the old relations go because they fail to develop the forces, from which we can infer that the new relations supervene, and persist, because and as long as they do develop the forces. And that is a functional explanation, and the very fu nctional explanation I defended. I I I take Van Parijs's use of Thorstein Veblen (pp. as an attempt to forestaU something like the above line of criticism. He derives from Veblen a scenario in which the prevailing relations further the development of the forces, but do not prevail for that reason. l nstead, they prevail because working with the existing productive forces so shapes producers' minds that it causes them to adopt what merely happen to be forces-improving relation s.
But whatever may be the intrinsic plausibility of the Veblen scenario, it does. not deliver the goods required here, since it does not cater for the inherent tendency of the forces to develop. To be sure, the story affirms that the r elations which get selected do develop the forces but, as Van Parijs rightly says, it does not follow that they are selected because they develop the forces, and in the story they are not, indeed, selected for that reason. Yet even if, by remarkable concidence, relations not selected because they develop the forces always in fact did so, the development thesis would remain unsustained, since it " requires that it is of the nature of the forces to develop" ( Cohen 1978, I 35), and not merely that they always develop, for this or that adventitious reason.
Now in the foregoing I invoke the development thesis to confound Van
Parijs's attempt to use Veblen to show that the _primacy of the forces does not require functional explanation. Van Parijs might therefore wish to press against me the observations of his footnote II , in which he remarks t hat functional explanat ion "may be required for primacy to be reconciled with two-way causation and other views Marx or Marxists hold. But (I) these other views would have to be specified -which Cohen does not do. And (2) there is a high risk that, once these views are stated explicitly , the alleged solution will be trivial."
The first of these charges is out of place, since the development thesis is introduced in conjunction with the primacy thesis, and the primacy thesis requires the development thesis as a premiss. Hence nothing solves the primacy puzzle unless it preser ves the development thesis. But what about Van Parijs's warning (see his (2)) that the functional-explanatory solution might now be "trivial"? Weil, what does Van Parijs mean by "trivial" here? lf he means that it will now follow logically that functional explanation is the solution , then I do not mind if my claim is "trivial": all proven claims are trivial in that sense. But there emerges no reason to .call it trivial if, as it should, "trivial" entails "uninteresting". lt is not uninteresting that the primacy of the productive forces requires functional explanation, even if it is deonstrable when all the elements of the theory are in place.
ln fact, however, I do not daim to provide a logical proof of my contention that functional explanat ion is the required solution. I argue , more modestly, t hat functional explanation does solve the primacy puzzle, and I challenge others to produce an alternative solution which is not functionalexplanator y. V an Parijs has not done so. is not an alternative in any polemically significant sense : among other things, his redefi nition of the expression "forc.es of production" serves no critical purpose. These charges are defended at length in the ancilla. 12 I respond here onl y to Suchting's attempt to assign primacy neither to forces nor to relations of production, but to the dass struggle.
1 3 Before responding to that, however, it is appropriate to place the dis. pute about the relati ve places of forces and relations on the one hand and dass struggle on the other in its proper context.
The aim of KMTH (see Cohen 1978 , ix) was to construct a tenable theory of history in broad conformity with Marx's writings. I aclcnowledged (27) that history was not, of course, entirely amenable to theoretical treatment, and, bearing in mind that Iimitation, I tried to present the best theory of history which respected Marx's pronouncements on the subject.
lf one gives up the very project of a theory of history, it is easy to reject the t hesis of the primacy of the productive forces. But, so I daimed , there is no alternative to that thesis if there is to be a Mar xist theory of history. As I said: "With focus on the development of the productive forces, history becomes a coherent story. Perhaps his tory is not really coherent , but Marx thought it was , and he said the development of material power made it so." ( Cohen 1978, ISO) A c r itic like Suchting, who thinks' I misconstrue Marx here, must either deny that Marx thought history coherent o r find an alternative basis for its coherence in Marx.
Suchting and others hope to found historical coherence on the alte rnative basis of what he calls (p. 171) the "plangent" open ing sentence of the Communist Manifesto:: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of dass struggles" .
1 4 l n KMTH I argued against that move, both textually and theoretically (Cohen 1978 , 148~so)·. The theoretical argument was a challenge to those who make dass struggle fundamental to explain, other than by reference to the disposition of dasses to develop the productive forces , what makes successful dass es succeed. The textual argument was a set of passages in which Ma r x explains dass success in just t hat way, such as the Manifesto statement that "the econ.omic and political dominon of the bourgeois dass" was an outcome of the fact that feudal relations of production had become fetters on productive development and t herefore "had to be burst asunder" (CW 6, 489). I conduded that "the dass which rules through a period, or ' emerges triumphant from epochal conflict, is the dass best suited, most able and disposed, to preside over the development of the productive forces at the given time" (Cohen 1978, 149 For all that, I wou ld not "downplay" "the practical political significance" of dass str uggle ( p .174). As I hope to make dear in section 8 below, I think it has primary political significance. Nor do I wish to reject , or deflate, the Manifesto's first sentence. For it is not inconsistent with the thesis of the primacy of the product ive forces, as that is expounded in KMTH.
The Manifesto sentence implies that major his torical changes are brought .a bout by dass struggle. But that is consistent with the doctrine of KMTH , since (so that doctrine sa ys) if we want to know why dass struggle br' ought about this change rather than that, then we must turn 'to the dialectic of forces and relations of production which governs dass behaviour and is not explicable in terms of it, and which determines the long-run outcome of dass struggle, though not, of course , its every twist and turn.
Things other than forces and relations of production, such as the interactional structures studied by game theory 1 5, help to explain the vicissitudes of dass struggle and the strategies pursued in it, but they c~nnot give a Marxist answer to t he question why dass wars (as opposed to battles) are settled one way rather than another. Marx found the answer in the character of the productive forces: "The conditions under which definite productive forces can be applied are the conditions of the rule of a definite da~s of society". (GI, 185) And he did not give that answer only when he was generalizing about history. He applied the generalization to cases, as, for example, when he said that "If the rroletariat overthrows the political rule of the bourgeoisie, its victory wil only be temporary ... as long as the material conditions have not yet been created which make necessary the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production. " 16 Note that Marx writes not "make possible" but "make necessary", a ph rase which Iimits what can be independently decided by dass struggle more than the former one would. The Communist Manifesto contains similar phrases (see the one about the transition from feudalism to capitalism quoted at p. 267 above) and therefore cannot be recruited to the nonMarxist view that all history is, in the final analysis, explained by dass struggle.
P rosecuting his contention that Marxism should contract a Iiaison with game theory, Jon Elster remarks tht "game theory is invaluable to any analysis of the historical process that centres on exploitation, struggle, alliances and revolution (Elster 1982, 453) . But for Marx ian analysis those phenomena are not primary but, as it were, immediately secondary, on the periphery of the centre: they are among the "forms in wich men become conscious of the conflict [ between forces and relations of production] anci fight it out" (Preface to A Contribution to t he Critigue of Political Economics). To put the point differently, we may say that the items on Elster's Iist are the actions at the centre of the historical process, but that for Marxism there are also items more basic than actions at its centre.
By " revolution" Elster must mean the political phenomenon of transfer of state power, as opposed to the transformation of economic structu re political revolution initiates or reflects. Many facts about political revolutions are accessible to game theoretical explanat ion, but not the world-historical facts that there was a bourgeois revolution and that there will be a proletarian one (if there will be a proletarian one).
While rea.Jizing that I insist on a "fundamentalist" reading of historical materialism, Richard Miller notes that "Cohen ... allows that political and ideological struggle may be essential to the destruction of the old social relations" (Miller 1981, 94 ) 1 7. lndeed, and I am prepared to go further. I do not wish to deny that dass struggle is always essential for social tran·sformaton. My position does not prevent me from accepting Marx and Engels' Statement that "the dass struggle is the immediate driving power of histor y". 18 On the contrary: it is the doctrine of the primacy of the productive forces which accounts for the otherw,ise puzzling occurrence of the word "immediate" in this important sentence .. "Immediate" 'is opposed to "underlying " .
The reader might now agree that the following characterization of my views distorts them: "Cohen ... seems committed to the view that the kind of human activity capable of effecting social change would have to be not consciously political activity but technical and scientific activi.ty: the invention of new technology, having as its unconscious byproduct the emergence of new social relations." (Norman 1980, 6) I do not see how one can wring out of KMTH a denial that consciously political activity effects social change. How could an explanation why politics effects this social change rather· than that entail a denial that politics effects social change? Marx was not being untrue to what I claim was his theory when · he called on workers, rather than scientists and technicians, to revolutionize society. ln encouraging workers to bring about social change he was not asking them to bring about what would explain their doing so: the exhaustion of the progressive capacity of the capitalist order, and the availability of enough productive power to instat a socialist one.
7·
Mitton Fisk's treatment of dass struggle is more subtle thal') Suchting's, but, before I address it, I should like to say a word about Fisk's generat methodological position, which I do not u oderstand.
Fisk rejects the "sharp separations" of "atomistic ontology", which I am · said to favour, and he recommends "systematic integrations" in their stead. Among what are not to be sharply separated are the cause and the effect in a causal relationship (p. 182). Now a cause and its effect indeed seem to me to be distinct entities, and necessarily so. But the necessary separation between them is compatible with the fact that they are integrated, and, if you like, systematically integrated, in the causal relationship. lt therefore seems to me wrong to treat separation and systematic integration as mutually exdusive· condi- Fisk links his notion of systematic integraton with a supposedly HegelioMarxian concept of explanatory primacy, which is introduced on p. 183. In this concept, primacy is not a matter of "which way the causal arrow runs". What enjoys primacy is the aspect of society "that makes possible the exist ing connections between various social entities", the aspect which is the "framework" within which causal arrows ·run as they do. Fisk withholds this kind of primacy from the productive forces and assigns it to the production relations (Abstract, pp. 190, 192) . Productive forces are said to Iack primacy because they would not have the effects they do outside the given framework of p roduction relations. But if forces Iack primacy for that r eason, then relations, · being primary for Fisk should have the effects they do irrespective of the character of the forces: for otherwise, by parity of reasoning, they would be as unprimary as the forces are . But the effects of relations plainly do depend on the nature of the forces. Hence either I do not understand Fiskian prifT!acy, or he is wrong to assign it to relations or production.
8.
In section 5 of Fisk's piece the theme of atomism vers us integration does not obtrude, and I agree with much of what he says. But I do not ag ree with his opening argument, which runs as follows: "There is a political factor that enters into the development of the productive forces. the development of the productive forces within a set of productive relations has Iimits set by the willingness of people to cooperate under those relations to develop the productive forces. It would be nice if we could say that their cooperation will be forthcoming when those relation s have the potential for developi ng the forces. But the claim would be circular since that potential of the relations to develop the forces depends crucially on cooperation." (p. 192). But the stated claim is not, as Fisk contends, circular. For the fact that cooperation is a necessary condition of the relations actually developing the forces does not show that cooperation is a necessary condition of their possessing the potential to do so, in one pertin· ent reading of that phrase. Relations might possess the potential to develop the forces in the sense that if 'cooperation with them is forthcoming, they will do so: cooperation is evidently not necessary to their possessing that potential.
What is more, some relations would not develop the forces even if cooperation with them was assured. lt follows that this hypothesis, of which the penultimate sentence in the above extract is an inexplicit formulation, is neither trivial not circular: cooperation is forthcoming just when, the relations being otherwise suitable , cooperation is crucial to the development of the forces . (Consider the analogous hypothesis that pilots will man just those planes which are apt to fly when manned. T he fact that these same planes would not fly unmanned does not make that plausible hypothesi s ci rcu Ia r.)
Now the non-circular and substantive daim italicized above is false for periods of transition from one social form to another , since, du ring such periods, more than one set of relations would, with cooperation, develop the forces, and it is logically impossible for more than one set to obtain. When "the productive forces have been developed sufficiently under the existing productive relations to sustain a new social order" (p. 192) both the old relat ions (at least for a time) and the prospective new ones would, with cooperation, develop the forces further , and in such a period which relations prevail indeed becomes what Fisk calls a political question, and one whose answer is not settled by the state of the productive forces. Those who falsely suppose that its answer is objectively available, and does not depend on class struggle , divide, as Fisk perceptively remarks, into "adventurists [ who] accuse opportunists of overestimating the ability of the ruling class to develop the producti ve forces, and opportunists [ who] accuse adventurists of u nderestimating that ability" ( p. 194). I agr ee with Fisk that both · sides in that dispute suppose, wrongly, tliat there is a theoretical answer to a c rucial question of practice.
But not all cases are transitional cases. Let us suppose, with Fisk (p. 193) , that there was no objective answer to the question whether the Western ruli.ng dass could still develop the productive forces afte r 1945. Then eithe r he thinks there is never such an answer, or he grant-s that there sometimes is. But if he thinks there never is, he is no Marxist. No Marxist, indeed no one with a shred of sociological initiation , could think that the British capitalist dass might have been overthrown in 1795· A Marxist may think that there are cases of Fisk-like inde.terminacy, but not that they are the general case. And I wonder whether Fisk hirnself really think s they are the general case. He refers, as we saw, to a time when "the productive forces have been developed sufficiently ... to sustain a new social order" ( p. 192). That reference implies that there are other times when a new social order is impossible because the for ces are not developed enough to sustain it. But if a new order is impossible for that reason, then Fisk will surely agree that it is 'impossible for an objective reason, which is independent of human will -in which c ase his disagreement with me disappears. He can only continue to disagree on the bizarre alternative view that even then the new order is impossible ~ because people are unprepared to cooperate with it. Such a view combines an Utopian belief that what sort of society we have depends entirely on human will, with an Utopian belief that, for no objective reason, the required human will is sometimes necessarily unforthcoming.
The vicissitudes of dass struggle decide just when a ruling dass is supplanted, once a superior social order is objectively possible. But if one goes beyend that and says that the vicissitudes of dass struggle decide whet her or not the ruling dass is supplanted at all, so t hat there is no objectively grounded answer to the question whether it will, in the end, go, then one denies the parameters within which, for Marxism, dass struggle operates.
In my view dass war is like war, and in war there are three pertinent possibilities:
i.
We know that if we engage with the enemy, weshall win. ii.
We k now that if we engage with the enemy, we shall lose.
111.
We know neither of these things, either because it is difficult to know which of them is true, or because neither is true.
In discussion of his pap~r 1 9 Fisk said that i. and ii. are not historically important cases. I disagree. To be sure , they are not the cases in which there is likely to be massive dass struggle: we will not engage in case ii, and presuming, as one can, that they know what we do, they will not engage in case i. To the extent that people are knowledgeable and rational, iii. is the only case in which dass struggle will rage. But it is a matter of great historical importance that i. and ii. are true, when t hey are, and that dass struggle is, accordingly, muted. One cannot den y the h istorical importance of non -tran sitional period s.
9·
Steven Luke's charact eristically lucid and challenging contribution is concerned with Chapter VIII of KMTH , which is about the relationship between the economic base and its legal superstructure. Lukes says that he will "focus exdusively" (p. 2I2) on that relationship, but he also addresses the problern of moral norms, which are not, in my view, superstructural, 20 and my response will cover that aspect of his critique as weil.
A number of critics of Marxism, and notably John Plamenatz, have argued that the Marxist pretension that (elations of production explain superstructural relations of law is necessarily false, since a searching explication of .what must be meant, and of what Marx hirnself meant, by relations öf production reveals that, being essentially relations of ownership, they are themselves legal in character. They may therefore not be regarded as non-legal phenomena distinct from and explanatory of legal relations.
I wanted to defeat . that criticism, and I therefore undertook a twofold task: first, to present a plausible characterization of relations of production from which legal terms are expunged, and then i:o argue that relations of production, in the recommended rechtsfrei characterization, might reasonably be thoug'ht to explain super structu ral owner ship relations. Lukes is concerned to challenge only the first and relatively " nariow" (p. 212) part of that exercise, my attempt simply to distinguish between base and superstructure. Accordingly, my obligation · here is to defend that distinction. and not, except en passant, the functional explanation of property law by economics which presupposes it. lf that explanation is defensible, then so is the distinction it presupposes, but the converse is not true.
My remarks fall into three ·parts· . . ln section 10 I argue that the indispensability of norms to economic relations does not show that the latter are not conceptually independent of the former. In section 11 I explain why my device for characterizi·ng the economic base is not intended to provide an analysis of social relationships. And in section 12 I question the bearing of the problern of objectivity in social science on the thesis that the base is distinct from the superstructure.
io. The chief instrument of my defense of the distinction between base and superstruc.ture was a distinction between rights, in the usual legal sense (Cohen 1978, 62) , and powers, which were defined as follows:
"a man has the power to !1\ if and only if he is able to !1\, where 'able' is non-normative. 'Able' is used normatively . when 'He is not able to 0' may be true even though he is !1\-ing, a logical feature of legal and moral uses of 'able'. Where 'able' is non -normative, 'He is !1\-ing' entails 'He is able to !1\'." ( Cohen 1978, 22o) Notice that to say that a person has a power, in the defined sense, is to say nothing about what confers the power on him, or sustains his exercise of it. The answer tothat question could involve brute force, or ideology, or, or course, the law. And in law-abiding society the law will figure prominently in the answer, since "in law-abiding society men have the powers they do because they have the rights they do" (Cohen 1978, 232) . But rights and powers even then remain · distinct, and one way of seeing the distinction between them is to note that "the power to 0 is what you have in addition to the right to !2J when your . ·right to 0 is effective, and ... the right to 0 is what you have in addition to the power to !1\ when your power to 0 is legitimate . " (Cohen 1978, 219) Now relations of production involve what people are effectively able to do, legitimately or otherwise. Hence, while to have a right over some productive force is to stand in a superstructural relation of law, to have a power over some productive force is to sta.nd in a basic. relation of production. And the claim that base and superstructure are conceptually . distinct now r esolves itself into the claims that it is logically possible to have a right without the power you .have when the right is effective, and . to have a power without the right that would make the power legitimate. Thus ineffective rights ·and illegitimate powers are proofs of the conceptual distinctness of base and superstructure. And though, as I acknowledged, rights are usually effective and powers are asually legitimated, that truth does not erode the conceptual distin· ction historical materialism requires. The distinction would be . intact even if, what is false, there never existed an ineffective righ.t or an illegitimate power.
Powers are usually legitimate because, as I unequivocally said -this was the title of section (4) of Chapter V 111 -"bases need super structu res,": legal protection, a ·coveriilg of legal riorm, is ,generally indispensable 'to the enjoyment of economic power. I therefore asserted. both the conceptual distinctness of norms and powers and the indispensability, in general, of norms to powers. lt follows that I did not regard th~ proposition that · powers generally need norms as a suitable premiss for denying that the two are conceptually distinct. Perhaps I was wrong, and . the · distinction I defend can indeed be impugned on the basis of the premiss I grant, but to show that one mu st do more than state and reiterate the said premiss. · My main objection to Luke's critique is that it is largely an emphatic Statement of what' I already amply acknowledged. He insists on what I grant, and · insist on myself, that powers generally need the support of norms, and he does not spell out wh y .I am not entitled to assert that.
Lukes focusses largely on moral norms, rather than on the legal ones with which Chapter VIII was concerned, but this does not alter the essence of our dispute. Suppose t hat ·he is right that moral norms are generally indispensable to basic relations of· power. · And suppose, too, that the moral norms observed in economic life are less plausibly explained as functional for . t he economy ~hat ownership law is. The conjunction of ' these claimsand Luke's case rests on them -does not show that moral norms are conceptually implicated in relations of power. The indispensability of ~ to !!_, and the fact that ~ is not ex_ plained by !!_, do not in combination show that !!. cannot be described in ~-free terms.
I need not differ with Lukes when he says that a "stable system of enablements and constraints, to be effective, requires t hat I and relevant others are generally motivated by certain kinds of shared (teleological) reasons for acting and not acti-ng" (p. 217), for that is just a version of the indispensability claim. But does it. follow that, as Lukes adds, "these [ the reasons] give such enablements and constraints [ a] distinctively norma~ive character"? Only, at most, · in a trivial and uncontroversial sense . For one might, with a pinch of infelicity, say of an ~ which requires a .!! t o be stable that it therefore has a .!!_-ish character: a dictatorship to which the support of the Church is indispensable might be said to have a religious character (though I would prefer not to say such a thing on merely that basis). But that which the religion here stabilizes can certainly be described in religion-free terms. And similarly, even if powers sustained by norms have in that good or bad sense a normative character, we can still separately conceive, . in norm-free terms, what the norms are stabilizing, and I need not and do not assert anything stronger.
To achieve clarity in this matter, one must distinguish between a non-normative concept of power, and a concept of non-normative, or non-normatively based , power. I recomrr.end the first concept, not the second, and much of Luke's critique depends on his having confused the two.
To see that he is subject to this charge, consider pp. 219-220 of his article. He there distinguishes between a "pure, non-normative relationship of power -say, of simple coercion", and one which is in sorr.e way normatively freighted, because it depends, for example, on the belief that it is rnorally right to honour agreements; and he then proceeds as though I am committed to the falsehood that all relationships of power are. non-normative in his sense. But constructing a non-normative concept of power carries no such commitment. The concept is constructed to cover what Lukesian non-normative and Lukesian normative relationships of power have in common -their being relationships of power. What I call "powers" a r e not essentially non-normative (in Lukes's sense of not being supported by norms) but simply not essentially normative, and I have no difficulty in admitting that, in the standard case, "norms ... are what enables" people to exercise powers (pp. [219] [220] . My claim is just that what norms enable are not themselves norms.
ln illustration of the point that powers, as I define them, are what mere coercers and benefitters from norms have in common, I said that it is true both · of an illegal squatter (whose tenure is secured by, for example, savage dogs whom the legitimate authorities cannot overcorne) and a legal landowner that they have the power to use their land and exclude others from it ( Cohen 1978, 223-4) . Lukes objects that, unlike the squatter , the legal landowner can, by virtue of an environment of legal and other. norms, do such things as bequeath his property to others. Now it is true that the squatter cannot precisely bequeath his land, since bequeathing is an essentially legal activity. But it does not follow, and it is false, that he can. not achieve the e ffect of bequeathal, by the brute means he favours: he can bring it about that another has over his land the same power he now has over it. And his power to do that complex thing is also enjoyed by t he legal landowner, so that Lukes is wrong to conclude that "one cannot identify powers •.. embodied in norm-governed economic relationships independently of. the norms which .•• govern them" (p. 220). (See, too, t he remarks in section 11 (iii) below, which cast further light on the e rror in Lukes' objection.)
11.
My non -normative characterization of powers was not an attempt to define what social relations (really) are. I did not say: some may think that social relations importantly involve norms, but act ually they are no-. thing but relations of power. My thesis that legal property norms obtain because · they secure powers conceptually. distinct from them burdens me with no need to . deny the claim of Plamenatz, which Lukes endorses (p. 212) , that "all properly social relations are moral and customary " .
I must therefore t ake up what Lukes says at p . 218 about "the basic economic relationship of . contract. lf any relation of production is centrat to the economic structure of capitalism, this must be. Can it be described in the manner proposed [ i.e., in abstraction from the norms governing it] ?" I reply: (i) Lukes did not' reject my description of relations of production as relat ions of power over productive forces , the issue between us being whether those relations of power a re conceptually separable from norms. Since contract is not a relation of power over productive forces, it is not a relation of production . in the required sense.
There is , neverthdess, an important connect ion between contract and relation s of production, since, in capitalist society, the bringing together of productive forces such as the worker's labour power and the· capit. alist's means of production standardly proceeds via contract s. And contracts, I acknowledge, a re essentially ~ entities, involving as t hey 9o exercises of rights of ownership. What I must and do claim is that such exercises, . when effective, are accompanied by exercises of powers to do what one has those rights to do, powers which may be non-normat ively described.
(ii) Now in desc ribing those powers 'and their exercise t' do not take myself to be providing a description of contract considered properly as such . ·I intend , instead , to be .providing a matehing non-normative analogue of that normative relationship. To describe the powers which match rights is not to describe the rights themselves but just, of course, the 'powers which match them. What is the difference between an ·enforceable and a de facto unenforceable but legitimate contract? In the second Üre exercise of rights is unaccompanled by an exercise of matehing powers :
So while the relation of cont ract, properly so called, is indeed "essentially norm-governed" (p. 218}, that is immaterial, since powers are supposed to match, not analyse norms. i..ukes is right that exercises of powers do not identify exercises of the rights those powers match, but he is right about that precisely bec ause of the conceptual distinctness of rights and powers he elsewhere strives to deny.
(iii} Lukes is also right (p. 219) that contracts are normative not only in that they involve exercises of rights , but also fn that what one has the right to do is often itself d escribed in normative language. lt follows that we do ·not reach a norm-free description when we replace such a phrase as "he exercised his right to alienate his labour power" by the phrase "he exercised his power to alienate his labour power": "alienate" is a legally defined term. But, as I indicated at p. 221 For it is important to realise that "matching" is nothing but a Iabel for the syntactical relationship expressly defined at pp. 219-222 of KMTH. You guarantee that a power matches a right simply by following the perfectly explicit recipe for achieving a matehing power which I lay down, by making the appropriate deletions and substitutions in the phrase ·denoting the right. T he viability of the matehing programe is then ensured by the common syntax of rights and powers.
21
( iv} I would add, finally, that I do not find the doctrine of Herbert Spencer, or Durkheim's Spencer (p. 218), in the least credible, nor, of course, equivalent tothat of Cohen's Marx.
I disagree completely with the methodological doctrine Lukes applies here, and · with his development of it elsewhere (see Lukes 1974, especially Chapter 6). But suppose that the doctrine is correct. Then I still think it is inappropriate to apply it to the present dispute. For historical materialists need not be mor.e committed to objective, normatively neutral historiography and social science than non -Marxist historians and social scientists need be. lf social sdence in generat can accommod~te itself .to Luke's methodological strictures, then so can historical materialism. And if historical materialism . falls before those strictures, then so does any historiography which presumes mere(y. to tell it like it was. Accordingly, the methodological issue should be debated in generat terms, and not in the specific context of a dispute about the tenability of the historical materiaHst distinction between base and superstructure.
Lu kes has conflated two questions. Suppose he is· right (p. 217) that whether or not I think a slave has the power to withhold his labour power depends on whether or not I think it would be r~asonable for a slave to risk death by rebelling, and that such a judgment of reasonableness is a normative judgment. Making such a judgment, I. conclude that a slave Iacks the power to withhold his labour power. To defend the judgment, I would now have to defend the relevant norm, but it does not follow that in attributing Iack of power to the sla ve I am saying something about the norins of the slave's society. My contention that a norm-free characterisation of powers is always possible is unrefuted by the thesis that the characterization of powers which I favour depends on !!!Y. norms. Even if it is true that how the economic structure "is conceived will be relative to perspectives that are ... not normatively neutral", no doubt consequently attaches to my "claim that norms can be seen as heinging about and sustaining relations of production while remaining. no part of their content". ( p. 2I6). T he s upposed normative non-neutrality of social science does not entail that every object it studies is itself normatively loaded. Hence Lukes's conclusion does not follow from his premiss.
But is his premiss true? h he right that a characterization of the slave's powers requires judgments about what forms of resistance would · be reasonable? I think not. I put this as my basis for saying that the slave Iacks the power to withhold h.is labour power: "if he does not work he is likely to be killed, and he will certainly die" (Cohen 197.8, 222) . That statement seems to me to require no judgment of reasonableness and indeed no normative judgment whatsoever. lt seems to me quite objectively true (or false). To be sure, it gives an incomplete description of the slave's power position. To get a fuller picture of it, more such normatively neutral conditional statements would have to be added. And, contrary to what Lukes says on p. 217, there is no problern about what conditions should be specified in their antecedents. The more conditions thai: are specified, the greater will be the amount of normatively neutral inlormation · about the slave's position. With enough such conditionals to hand, we have a tolerably full desc ription of the economic ·structure of a society, and one with no normative entailments or presuppositions at all. 22 I do not here also respond to the challenging treatment of KMTH provided by the editor, Anton Leist, in the same. number. The reason is that I work very slowly , and slower still on material written in German, and Leist's piece came into my hands too recently for me to cope with it in ad~ance of the required deadli ne.
8 See p. 200 for Van Parijs's formulations PTo and PT2 , and also for his PT I, a variant of PTo. PT I says that the forces determine the relations to a far greater extent than the relations determine the forces. Van Parijs introduces PTI on the basis of this statement of the primacy thesis: "The primacy thesis is that the nature of a set of production relations is ex lained b the Ievel of develo ment of the roductive forces emrace y it to a ar greater extent t an vice versa: some suc qualifying phrase is always to be understood whenever the primacy thesis is asserted)" (Cohen 1978, 134) . The phrase in parentheses has misled Van Parijs into one of his misidentifications of the primacy puzzle, which I describe in a moment. I included the phrase · because not every feature of relations , and not even every feature of them v.hich affects the forces' development, characterizes the relations because of its effect on the forces' development. There are, that is, features of relations which might be thought to threaten the primacy of the forces, and the apparent threat they pose i s not neutr alized in the wa y (4 ) neutralizes ( 5 )' s th reat. I rev iew those features at pp. I64-5 of KMTH, and I conclude, on a merely intuitive basis, that, despite them, "tho productive forces on the whole dominate the production relations". But that is not a cont ribution to the solution of the rimar uzzle. For the puzzle is to reconcile (2) wit 5 , not to reconci e wit the more generat fact that relations affect forces. 12 See footnote 2 above. (My defense of the stated charges was originally intended for inclusion in the present article. I have removed it on the· advice of Anton Leist, who rightly regards it as of insufficient generat interest to warrant its apj>earance here).
13
According to Suchting, the dass struggle is the "ultimate determinant" of both the forces and the relations of production (pp. 172-3), though, as I show in the ancilla , he is not fully faithful to that assertion of ultimacy.
14 Before invoking the Manifesto, Suchting quotes a Capital text which he regards as very important and from which he omits a phrase which I would say assigns primacy to the productive forces. T he phrase is unomitted in his earlier quotation of the text in the Iess polemical context of p. 165.
